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Over the course of the Third Reich (1933-1945), mass murder became the distinguishing feature of Nazism, whether in concentration camps within Germany,
the extermination centers in occupied Poland, or in the killing �elds of eastern
Europe. Tens of millions of men, women, and children, including six million Jews,
were killed as Adolf Hitler sought to gain control of Europe in his quest for a
“Thousand Year Reich.” The perpetrators of genocide included both men and
women who served in a diverse range of organizations designed to police German
society and to control the territories conquered by the . In addition, the Nazis enlisted hundreds of thousands of foreign auxiliaries from conquered territories into
the ranks of the SS or Schutzstaffel, the police, and the army who also participated
in acts of atrocity and mass killing, especially in the occupied East.
While the most proli�c and most well-known of the perpetrators came from
among the ranks of Heinrich Himmler’s and police empire, genocide was a societal
endeavor that required the active and tacit consent of millions. It was a process
that involved soldiers, medical professionals, and bureaucratic functionaries.
Genocide transcended gender lines and ultimately bene�ted millions of ordinary
Germans who pro�ted from the plundered wealth of Jewish neighbors and conquered peoples. The murderers and their accomplices also included a broad range
of foreign nationals including Eastern European auxiliaries, Ukrainian concentration camp guards, Belarusian, Hungarian, and French policemen, Romanian soldiers, and volunteers from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Wallonia,
and Spain (Böhler & Gerwarth, 2017).

Primary targets were European Jews, antisemitically described by Hitler
(1925/1939) in Mein Kampf as “culture-destroyers” (p. 398) and “parasites in the
body of other peoples” (p. 419) were the primary victims of Hitler’s lethal racial
fantasy. However, other groups including over 200,000 Sinti and Roma men,
women, and children perished at the hands of the Germany perpetrators (Lewy,
2000). Additionally, over three million Soviet prisoners of war died in German military captivity after 1941 and millions of civilians in the occupied territories perished because of a premeditated strategy of direct and indirect murder that embraced starvation, slave labor, and mass population resettlement (Streit, 1991; Kay,
2006). Within Germany, the Nazi regime also targeted its own citizens, including
people who were considered LGBT, Jehovah’s Witnesses, so-called ‘asocials,’ and
those classi�ed as medically or physically disabled (Burleigh, 2000).
While knowledge of the vast scale and scope of the murders committed under National Socialism is widely known, scholars have presented a broad number
of explanations related to why these men and some women became murderers
themselves, or direct accomplices in the implementation of systematic mass murder. Immediately after World War II, public opinion remained shaped in large part
by perceptions of Nazi fanatics. This popular perception re�ected Allied and
German wartime propaganda including the reports and newsreel footage of
delirious and euphoric Germans cheering Hitler as seen in the director Leni
Riefenstahl’s 1935 �lm Triumph of the Will. In a similar manner, the footage taken
by US and British military �lm crews upon the liberation of the concentration
camps in Germany in 1945 highlighted the inhumanity of Nazi racial policies and
created the impression of an SS dominated by sadists who enjoyed abusing, torturing, and killing their victims. The 1961 trial of SS Lieutenant Colonel Adolf
Eichmann, one of the key organizers of the “�nal solution,” who was abducted by
the Israeli secret service in Argentina, initiated a new discourse on what motivated the perpetrators. In her reports on the trial, the German Jewish émigré and
philosopher Hannah Arendt (1963) described Eichmann as a man characterized by
a “lack of imagination” who pursued genocide with “no motives at all” except for
his personal ambition for advancement (p. 134). Although controversial, Arendt’s
view proved powerful in reshaping popular perceptions of the killers especially
those in senior leadership who directed mass murder at their desks. For example,

Stanley Milgram (1974), a scholar at Yale, embraced Arendt’s theory on the “banality of evil” and devised a series of experiments with “ordinary” Americans between
1960 and 1963 that in his view demonstrated “the extreme willingness of adults to
go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority [�gure],” (p. 5) as otherwise “normal” people chose to abandon their personal ethical and moral beliefs
when directed by a person of authority.
The publication of the historian Christopher Browning’s (1992) widely acclaimed and highly in�uential book Ordinary Men reinvigorated scholarly interest
and discussions on the subject of motivations within the �eld of Holocaust
Studies. Based on the postwar criminal investigation of the wartime activities of a
group of Hamburg-based policemen, Browning examined the actions and motivations of a group of middle-aged police reservists in the mass murder of Jews in
Poland. Applying the �ndings of the social psychologists Stanley Milgram (1974),
Philip Zimbardo (1973), and Ervin Staub (1989) to these policemen, Browning (1992)
found the transformation of ordinary Germans into killers resulted from their
concern for acceptance and conformity within the group, respect and deference
for authority, and desire for career advancement behavior with racism and Nazi
propaganda playing a secondary role.
In 1996, the political scientist Daniel J. Goldhagen published Hitler’s Willing
Executioners that challenged Browning’s conclusions and reinterpreted the evidence related to Reserve Police Battalion 101. Goldhagen (1996) not only rejected
Browning’s �ndings, but he also rede�ned the nature of ordinary men in German
society by arguing, “Being ordinary in the Germany that gave itself to Nazism was
to have been a member of an extraordinary, lethal political culture” (p. 454). For
Goldhagen, the motive force and the principal cause for genocide was to be found
in the “eliminationist anti-Semitism” (p. 49) embedded within German culture that
was shared by all Germans whether assigned to the concentration camps, the police battalions, or supervising the death marches at the end of the war. This predisposition explained the participation of “ordinary Germans in the persecution
and extermination of the Jews, and therefore was the Holocaust’s principal cause”
(Goldhagen, 1996, p. 454).
While many in the scholarly community rejected Goldhagen’s �ndings as

monocausal and deterministic, his book provided renewed interest concerning
the question of how “ordinary men” could commit extraordinary evil, especially
within the �eld of social psychology. For example, James Waller (2002) employed a
comparative analysis of mass murder in the Holocaust, Cambodia, Guatemala, and
the Balkans and developed a model consisting of three parts: the actor, the context of the action, and the de�nition of the target. Using this framework, he examined dispositional (internal in�uences such as ideological beliefs), situational (external in�uences such as desire for promotion or personal gain), and social factors
to explain the willingness of individuals to become instruments of mass atrocity.
In contrast to social psychological analyses that tend to deemphasize emotional feelings or ideological causes for genocide, the historian Saul Friedländer
(1997) highlighted the importance of anti-Semitism and antisemitic tropes among
Germans in the 1920s and 1930s as a key facilitator of genocide. For Friedländer, it
was not the widespread acceptance by the German population of a culture of
“eliminationist anti-Semitism” that led to genocide, but rather a case in which
Adolf Hitler and the hard core of the Nazi Party took advantage of existing antisemitic beliefs to create quasi-religious theology of “redemptive anti-Semitism”
that laid the foundation for annihilation. In this view, Hitler targeted the Jews for
annihilation based on his messianic belief in the need for “a redemptive �nal battle for the salvation of Aryan humanity” (p. 314).
The German historian Götz Aly (2005/2006) offered another explanation for
the willingness of ordinary Germans to participate in the exclusion, persecution,
and eventual extermination of their Jewish neighbors. He argued that Adolf Hitler
and the Nazi Party provided material incentives to Germans by creating a “type of
racist-totalitarian welfare state” (p. 2). These incentives included the apartments
and houses of their former Jewish owners, household furnishings ranging from
furniture to bedsheets as well as plundered goods taken from both Jews and nonJews throughout occupied Europe. Aly contends, “While was a necessary precondition for the Nazi attack on European Jews, it was not a suf�cient one. The material interests of millions of individuals �rst had to be brought together with antiSemitic ideology before the great crime we now know as the Holocaust could take
on its genocidal momentum” (p. 6).

In contrast to attempts aimed at explaining the actions of German society as a
whole, there have been numerous studies focused on the activities and motives of
speci�c organizations. For example, the role of the German military in the Nazi
campaign of conquest and genocide has been an important focus of research. This
effort has shattered the myth of the “clean” or “apolitical” Wehrmacht propagated
soon after World War II and has demonstrated widespread knowledge among soldiers about the crimes committed against Jews, Sinti and Roma, and others as well
as frequent participation by military units and soldiers in atrocities and mass
murder, especially in Eastern Europe. The percentage of Wehrmacht members
who directly participated in atrocity and genocide may never be known, but the
secretly recorded conversations of German prisoners of war reveal that “practically all German soldiers knew or suspected that Jews were being murdered en
masse” (Neitzel & Welzer, 2011/2012, p. 101).
Omer Bartov (1992) led the way toward a fundamental reexamination of the
actions and motivations of German infantrymen on the Eastern Front. Bartov’s
pathbreaking study demonstrated how numerous soldiers became “brutalized instruments of a barbarous policy, and devoted believers in a murderous ideology”
(p. viii). He argued that their transformation into perpetrators resulted from the
“demodernization” of the war in the East caused by the destruction of primary
groups, a “perversion of discipline” enforced through harsh punishments, and the
politicization of an army that embraced Hitler and his racial ideology. Another
study highlighted the importance of comradeship and training in shaping the actions of common soldiers, but also noted the brutalizing effect of Nazi ideology as
it “seeped into the consciousness of the rank and �le” (Fritz, 1995, p. 242). In contrast to studies focusing on the actions of the German army in World War II, the
historian Isabell Hull (2005) identi�ed the genocidal military campaigns of the
German Imperial Army in Southwest Africa against the Herero and Nama peoples
prior to World War I as critical to shaping the military culture for future generations. Hull asserts that these colonial campaigns created a “cult of violence” and
“bequeathed practices, habits of action, and ways of behaving . . . [that] were easily harnessed for the ideological ends of even greater mass destruction and death”
(p. 333).
While military historians have stressed the importance of comradeship or the

concept of “brothers in arms” for explaining why soldiers �ght, the historian
Thomas Kühne (2017) focuses on the role of masculinity in promoting camaraderie
and conformity at the unit level. Comradeship in this view was the “cement of
male community” (p. 295) and a powerful bond between soldiers who risked the
threat of “social death” and exclusion from their cohort for opposing or failing to
participate in acts of atrocity and mass murder. In this view, ordinary soldiers
participated in atrocity and genocide not due to fear of punishment or ideological
indoctrination, but rather as a means for proving one’s masculinity as a “man
among men,” a bond strengthened by the shared experiences of danger and deprivation in the East (Kühne, 2017).
In contrast to studies of the German army as a whole, a focus on the activities of smaller units has provided new insights on the role and motivations of soldiers at the local level. Waitman Beorn’s (2014) examination of regimental and
company level units reveals the wide latitude of action available to individual units
and the key role of command climate and leadership in dictating the actions of
these units and the ways in which this led to involvement or the refusal to participate in genocide. Highlighting the impact of organizational culture on attitudes
and behaviors, Beorn concludes, “institutional and unit cultures were decisive for
the participation of German soldiers [in acts of atrocity]” (p. 243). In another
study, Jeff Rutherford (2014) examined three frontline infantry divisions and their
actions during the invasion of the Soviet Union in order to determine what led
these soldiers to participate in “an accelerating violent spiral in which Germans
responded with increased brutality and ruthlessness against Soviet civilians” (p. 4).
While acknowledging the in�uence of Nazi racial ideology, he argues that “military necessity” or a philosophy of the ends justifying the means became the standard used by military leaders to justify these acts in order to achieve their objectives on the battle�eld.
If the Wehrmacht participated in genocide, the SS and police were the primary organizations responsible for the destruction of the European Jews. In this
regard, Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police Heinrich Himmler
emerged as the “master architect of the Final Solution;” a man who shared Hitler’s
“ideological obsessions” and who created and oversaw the process of annihilation
(Breitman, 1991, p. 241, 246). If Himmler was the master architect of genocide, then

he needed subordinates who could turn these plans into reality. In this case, the
senior ranks of the SS consisted of men of action who were guided by ambition
and ideology. These perpetrators of genocide were not social mis�ts or simpleminded, but rather young, ambitious, well-educated men who embraced National
Socialist views of racial superiority and the belief in a Germanic empire (Wildt,
2003/2010).
These men who participated in the Einsatzgruppen or Special Mission Units,
the Waffen-SS, and the Order Police battalions became the key instruments of
mass murder in the occupied eastern territories and the “Holocaust by bullets”
(Desbois, 2009). In the case of the �rst, the men of the “mobile killing units” were
neither natural born killers nor inherent anti-Semites, but rather men “who believed in the principles of National Socialism so much that they made its ideology
the very basis of their behavior . . . [and who] convinced themselves that the road
to German rehabilitation was through racial, cultural, and ideological purity” (Earl,
2009, p. 297).
As Browning’s study of Reserve Police Battalion 101 demonstrated, it was not
only the SS but also German policemen who played a key role in genocide. In
Poland and the Soviet Union, the police battalions, units of some 500 men, became an indispensable instrument in the mass murder of the Nazi regime’s racial
enemies including Jews, Slavs, Sinti and Roma, and others. Several studies have
followed Browning’s path by examining the participation of the police in the “�nal
solution.” For example, Edward B. Westermann (2005) highlighted the critical role
of the SS and police leadership in creating an organizational culture that glori�ed
the ideals of a military identity and emphasized racial ideology. He argued, “the
impetus for genocide came from within an organization that established and promoted its own values, beliefs, and standards for behavior, that created an environment in which persecution, exploitation, and murder became both acceptable and
desirable attributes” (p. 239). In another study, Philip Blood (2006) argued that SS
and police units in World War II borrowed on a colonial and imperial tradition of
“security warfare” that encompassed the brutal and ruthless suppression of actual
and perceived opposition among conquered peoples, including extermination. In
a recent study, Ian Rich (2018) shifted the focus for explaining the participation of
policemen in mass murder by examining the important role played by the mid-

level of�cers at the company and platoon level. He asserted that these junior of�cers served as role models providing “ideologically grounded justi�cations” for the
rank and �le and proved “pivotal to the police battalions’ capacity to perpetrate
mass murder” (p. 3).
In addition to SS and policemen, foreign auxiliaries, whether serving in
German Security or Order Police units, in the labor and death camps in Poland, or
with armed formations of the Waffen SS and the German army, augmented overstretched German forces and were critical instruments for mass murder in the
East (Böhler & Gerwarth, 2017). The auxiliary units organized into companies and
battalions along with small detachments for duty in the countryside and in towns
drew their members primarily from former members of the police and the military. At the end of 1941, the total number of auxiliaries serving under German
command was 45,000, but a year later the number had ballooned to almost
300,000, including 100,000 Ukrainians alone, an increase that not coincidentally
corresponded with a massive wave of killing of Jews as well as the growing partisan threat faced by German forces in the East (Browning & Matthäus, 2004).
While these men may not have been ‘natural born killers,’ they did come
from social backgrounds in which antisemitism was not an uncommon belief, an
attribute that German forces attempted to leverage to their advantage through
ideological instruction and the promise of material bene�ts. A study of Ukrainian
auxiliaries found three socio-psychological types among these men (Radchenko,
2013). The �rst group consisted of “political activists” whose “ideological antisemitism provided the motivation for participation in anti-Jewish actions” (p. 455).
The second group was “enterprising conformists” (p. 456) who lacked any moral
convictions and simply adapted to the political realities of German rule. Finally,
“ordinary task performers” were men from lower class and rural backgrounds who
saw service as “a means for upward social movement” (p. 457). Whatever their ultimate motivation, Peter Black (2011) correctly noted, “The Nazis could not have implemented their “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” without assistance from
ethnic German and non-German auxiliaries” (p. 1).
From the discussion above, it is clear that scholars from a number of academic disciplines have devoted considerable research in trying to explain what

motivated institutions and individuals to participate in genocide. It is equally apparent that their theories and conclusions on motivation are as diverse as the
perpetrator groups themselves. While we may never know with certainty why ordinary, and not so ordinary, men and women chose to participate in mass murder,
we do know that genocide required the active participation and complicity of millions. Furthermore, there would have been no “�nal solution” without war and it
was Hitler’s obsession with race and the conquest of space that led to his decision
to invade Poland in 1939, a critical decision that “provided a framework within
which the Germans [involving cooperation at all levels] initiated and developed
systematic killing programs” (Weinberg, 1995, p. 219). Although Hitler may have
been the leading prophet of annihilation, genocide was ultimately a societal endeavor regardless of individual motivation.
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